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This paper reviews recent developments in international trade to evaluate several arguments concerning
the merits of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and their place in the world trade system. Taking
a multilateralist perspective, it makes several points: First, despite the proliferation of PTAs in recent
years, the actual amount of liberalization that has been achieved through PTAs is actually quite limited.
Second, at least a few studies point to significant trade diversion in the context of particular PTAs
and thus serve as a cautionary note against casual dismissals of trade diversion as a merely theoretical
concern. Equally, adverse effects on the terms-of-trade of non-member countries have also been found
in the literature. Third, while the literature has found mixed results on the question of whether tariff
preferences help or hurt multilateral liberalization, the picture is different with the more elastic tools
of trade policy, such as antidumping duties (ADs); the use of ADs against non-members appears to
have dramatically increased while the use of ADs against partner countries within PTAs has fallen.
Fourth, despite the rapid expansion of preferences in trade, intra-PTA trade shares are relatively small
for most PTAs; multilateral remain relevant to most member countries of the WTO.
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A	 ﾠ cornerstone	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ World	 ﾠ Trade	 ﾠ Organization	 ﾠ (WTO),	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐
discrimination:	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ discriminate	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ goods	 ﾠ entering	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠborders	 ﾠbased	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠof	 ﾠorigin.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠexception	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠprescript,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠXXIV	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠTariffs	 ﾠand	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠ(GATT),	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠpermit	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
agreements	 ﾠ(PTAs)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠXXIV,	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
enter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠby	 ﾠfully	 ﾠliberalizing	 ﾠ“substantially”	 ﾠall	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ raising	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ barriers	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ outsiders.	 ﾠ They	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ thereby	 ﾠ
sanctioned	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ Free	 ﾠ Trade	 ﾠ Areas	 ﾠ (FTAs),	 ﾠ whose	 ﾠ members	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ eliminate	 ﾠ
barriers	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
Customs	 ﾠUnions	 ﾠ(CUs),	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠadditionally	 ﾠagree	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
tariff	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠimports	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐members.	 ﾠAdditional	 ﾠderogations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐discrimination	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnabling	 ﾠClause,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠallows	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneralized	 ﾠSystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Preferences)	 ﾠand	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdisciplines	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠXXIV)	 ﾠamong	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Such	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ vogue.	 ﾠ Indeed,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠstands	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ decades,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ hundreds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
GATT/WTO-ﾭ‐sanctioned	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠnegotiated	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠevery	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠPTA.	 ﾠAmong	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠin	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNorth	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠFree	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠ
Agreement	 ﾠ(NAFTA)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠ(EEC),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMERCOSUR	 ﾠ
(the	 ﾠCU	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠArgentine	 ﾠRepublic,	 ﾠBrazil,	 ﾠParaguay,	 ﾠand	 ﾠUruguay)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ASEAN	 ﾠ(Association	 ﾠof	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠEast	 ﾠAsian	 ﾠNations)	 ﾠFree	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠArea	 ﾠ(AFTA).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Alongside	 ﾠthis	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠan	 ﾠintensification	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
economics	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ preferences,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ determinants	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
preferential	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterplay	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠand	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠ
approaches	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠfreer	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacceleration	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠfrustration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“slow”	 ﾠpace	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠargued	 ﾠby	 ﾠproponents	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
PTAs	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠfaster	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠpath	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠ
free	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠside,	 ﾠmultilateralists	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠ
losses	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ inefficiencies	 ﾠ caused	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ preferences	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ trade,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ imports	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
sourced	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ inefficient	 ﾠ partner	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ efficient	 ﾠ outsiders	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer.1	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠcostly	 ﾠto	 ﾠoutsiders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠhandicapped	 ﾠin	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
markets	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠincur	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠMultilateralists	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠ
monotonic	 ﾠ path	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ trade,	 ﾠ warning	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠ create	 ﾠ incentives	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ
liberalization.2	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
About	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ decades	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ passed	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ debates	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ virtues	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
                                                 
1	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠasserted,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconference,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠ
preferential	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠis	 ﾠproof	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“revealed	 ﾠpreference”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠimproving.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhold	 ﾠif	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠon	 ﾠby	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠ
maximizing	 ﾠgovernments,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdecidedly	 ﾠincorrect	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
intensely	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠlobbies	 ﾠoften	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠover	 ﾠless	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠconsumers)	 ﾠin	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠand	 ﾠmoulding	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠto	 ﾠbest	 ﾠ
serve	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinterests.	 ﾠClearly,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠpresumption	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠimproving,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠwell	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
PTAs	 ﾠ(see,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠKrishna	 ﾠ(1998)	 ﾠand	 ﾠGrossman	 ﾠand	 ﾠHelpman	 ﾠ(1995)).	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠAs	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠby	 ﾠProfessor	 ﾠErnesto	 ﾠZedillo	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠconference	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠNAFTA	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠ
Mexican	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠan	 ﾠ‘opportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdivert	 ﾠtrade”	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcompetitors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠand	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoutcome,	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ“quite	 ﾠhappy”	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
“preferential	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠstop”	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠextending	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠLatin	 ﾠ
America).	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ began.3	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ experience	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
preferential	 ﾠand	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠfronts	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime	 ﾠhas	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠempirically	 ﾠ
based	 ﾠ discussion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ topic.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ
reviews	 ﾠdevelopments	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
findings	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ researchers	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ evaluate	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ analytical	 ﾠ
arguments	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ area.	 ﾠ Taking	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ multilateralist	 ﾠ perspective,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ makes	 ﾠ
several	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproliferation	 ﾠof	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠ
amount	 ﾠof	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ limited.	 ﾠ Specifically,	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ flows	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ partner	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
receive	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfraction	 ﾠof	 ﾠworld	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcasts	 ﾠ
doubt	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ efficiency	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
achieving	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠviews	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠ
improving	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ practice,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ few	 ﾠ studies	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ diversion	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠPTAs.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠshould,	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠminimum,	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcautionary	 ﾠnote	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠcasual	 ﾠdismissals	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠconcern.	 ﾠEqually,	 ﾠ
adverse	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ terms-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐trade	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
found	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ literature,	 ﾠ highlighting	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ negatively	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ
outsiders.	 ﾠThird,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠrich	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfound	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠresults	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠor	 ﾠhurt	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠliberalization,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
picture	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠelastic	 ﾠtools	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠantidumping	 ﾠ
duties	 ﾠ(ADs);	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠshown	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠADs	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐members	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠdramatically	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠADs	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠpartner	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
PTAs	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfallen.	 ﾠFourth,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐
PTA	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠshares	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠPTAs.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠ
initiatives	 ﾠ involving	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rest	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
                                                 
3 See,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠBhagwati	 ﾠ(1993)	 ﾠand	 ﾠBaldwin	 ﾠand	 ﾠVenables	 ﾠ(1995).	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠBhagwati	 ﾠ2008)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Panagariya	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠdebates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠevolving	 ﾠand	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠargument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
motivation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlowering	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbarriers,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠare	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠa	 ﾠvehicle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠundertaking	 ﾠ“deeper”	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
achieve	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ harmonization	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ partners.4	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ
dimensions	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠharmonization	 ﾠis	 ﾠsought	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠboth	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
currently	 ﾠ fall	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ mandate	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ WTO	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
commitment	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ WTO	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ (such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ improvement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ customs	 ﾠ
administration	 ﾠand	 ﾠrules	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠprocurement)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠ
fall	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠmeasures,	 ﾠ
labor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠinnovations	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠrights).	 ﾠTo	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
argument	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠintegration,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠdata	 ﾠset	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠcompiled	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
WTO	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠits	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠpublication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠReview)	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcodifies	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ hundred	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ notified	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ WTO,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
additionally	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠenforceable.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
indeed	 ﾠ true	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ incorporated	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgo	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠis	 ﾠagain	 ﾠa	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
PTAs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ appear	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ legally	 ﾠ enforceable	 ﾠ status.	 ﾠ On	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ hand,	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfall	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO	 ﾠmandates	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠdeemed	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠenforceable	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠare	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠin	 ﾠnumber.	 ﾠThis,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠsome	 ﾠskepticism	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠPTAs,	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgone	 ﾠ
beyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO.	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠharmonization	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ optimal	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ additional	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ (for	 ﾠ instance,	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bilateral	 ﾠ flow	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ investments)	 ﾠ
remain	 ﾠopen	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠresearch.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Two	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠcomments	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠcasual	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠon	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠLawrence	 ﾠ(1997).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
II.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠHas	 ﾠBeen	 ﾠLiberalized	 ﾠThrough	 ﾠPTAs?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠargument	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠregionalism	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠslow	 ﾠpace	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠin	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠas	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ ask	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ actually	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ liberalized	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ
agreements	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠto	 ﾠliberalize,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠ
agreements,	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ otherwise	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ unable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ liberalize	 ﾠ
multilaterally.5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠReport	 ﾠ(WTR)	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠis	 ﾠinstructive	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠWTR	 ﾠreports	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠplace	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠ
partners	 ﾠmade	 ﾠup	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ18	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠworld	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠrose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ35	 ﾠ
percent	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠindicated	 ﾠexclude	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐EU	 ﾠtrade).	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠis	 ﾠincluded,	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠrose	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ28	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1990	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠover	 ﾠ50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠworld	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdollar	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠ
trade,	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠrose	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ537	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠUSD	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1990	 ﾠto	 ﾠ4	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠ
USD	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ966	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠto	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠ8	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠonce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠincluded.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
suggests	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ share	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ taking	 ﾠ place	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ PTA	 ﾠ
members.	 ﾠ However,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ WTR	 ﾠ points	 ﾠ out,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ statistics	 ﾠ vastly	 ﾠ overstate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
extent	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠso	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
goods	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠof	 ﾠzero	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ MFN	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ exemptions	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
liberalization	 ﾠunder	 ﾠPTAs,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvolume	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠ
is,	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage,	 ﾠquite	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠAs	 ﾠis	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsection,	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠvolumes,	 ﾠoften	 ﾠcited	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠindication	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠPTA,	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠimproving,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“trade	 ﾠdiverting”	 ﾠ
flows.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠflows	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠcited	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠset	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠ
aside	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdiscussion. 	 ﾠ
Specifically,	 ﾠWTR	 ﾠcalculations	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠexplosion	 ﾠin	 ﾠPTAs,	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ16	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠworld	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠ
rises	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ percent	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ intra-ﾭ‐EU	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ included	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ calculations).	 ﾠ
Furthermore,	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ2	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ(4	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠincluded)	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠ
place	 ﾠin	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠa	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ10	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
instance,	 ﾠwell	 ﾠover	 ﾠ50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠKorean	 ﾠimports	 ﾠenter	 ﾠwith	 ﾠzero	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ them.	 ﾠ Korea	 ﾠ offers	 ﾠ preferences	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ percent	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ imports,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
preference	 ﾠ margin	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ percent	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ virtually	 ﾠ none	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ imports.	 ﾠ
Similarly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndia,	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠentering	 ﾠunder	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠare	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfive	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠ
imports	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ percent	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ imports	 ﾠ coming	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ zero	 ﾠ MFN	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
virtually	 ﾠno	 ﾠimports	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ10	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
picture	 ﾠ emerges	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ exporting	 ﾠ side.	 ﾠ One	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ actively	 ﾠ
negotiated	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠis	 ﾠChile	 ﾠand	 ﾠ95	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠChilean	 ﾠexports	 ﾠgo	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠwith.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ27	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠChilean	 ﾠexports	 ﾠare	 ﾠeligible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠ
treatment	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ3	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠexports	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠmargins	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠ10	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠTable	 ﾠI	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠbreakdown	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvolumes	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠenter	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsample	 ﾠPTAs.	 ﾠ
Clearly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace	 ﾠunder	 ﾠzero	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariffs.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfraction	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenters	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠ
outside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠNAFTA.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Taken	 ﾠ together,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ preceding	 ﾠ statistics	 ﾠ suggest	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ extent	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ
liberalization	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠquite	 ﾠmodest,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠnegotiated.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
claim	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ proponents	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ regionalism	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ faster	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization.6	 ﾠAt	 ﾠsome	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
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 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegotiation	 ﾠover	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcomparable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduration	 ﾠof	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠnegotiation	 ﾠ
rounds	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCAFTA-ﾭ‐DR	 ﾠagreement,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠarea	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ
States	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Central	 ﾠ American	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Costa	 ﾠ Rica,	 ﾠ El	 ﾠ Salvador,	 ﾠ Guatemala,	 ﾠ Honduras	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Nicaragua	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDominican	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠtook	 ﾠwell	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecade,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1992	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ surprising.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ widely	 ﾠ understood	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ major	 ﾠ factor	 ﾠ working	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ opposition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ import	 ﾠ competing	 ﾠ
lobbies.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠunclear	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠlobbies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ easily	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ undertaken	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
preferential	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlobbies	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠ permit	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ rents	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ protected,	 ﾠ either	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠpartner	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsimply,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠan	 ﾠexemption	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠon	 ﾠimports	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcompete	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠproduction,	 ﾠ
suggesting	 ﾠcomplementarities	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠand	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠtariffs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠ explore	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ MFN	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ PTA	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ indeed	 ﾠ
complements,	 ﾠBaldwin	 ﾠand	 ﾠSeghezza	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠcorrelations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ10	 ﾠdigit	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisaggregation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ23	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ WTO	 ﾠ (for	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ available).	 ﾠ Consistent	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
preceding	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠand	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠare	 ﾠcomplements,	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmargin	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlow	 ﾠor	 ﾠzero	 ﾠfor	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠnations	 ﾠ
apply	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠtariffs.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplementarity	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconfirmed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
detailed	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠby	 ﾠJoshi	 ﾠ(2010a	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2010b)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠNAFTA	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
studies	 ﾠ suggest	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ factors,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ vested	 ﾠ sectoral	 ﾠ interests,	 ﾠ drive	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠat	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ expect	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ level,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
III.	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠCreation	 ﾠand	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠDiversion	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Does	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠpartners	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠas	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐discriminatory	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
imports?	 ﾠDo	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐discriminatory	 ﾠfree	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠaccrue	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠliberalization?	 ﾠ	 ﾠAre	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠareas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequated	 ﾠ
                                                                                                                                               
conceived	 ﾠto	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠcame	 ﾠinto	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries. with	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade?	 ﾠA	 ﾠthorough	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠplunge	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabstruse	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond-ﾭ‐best	 ﾠ(whose	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
indeed	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ discovered	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ analysts	 ﾠ working	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ economics	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
PTAs).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrudimentary	 ﾠfashion	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠ
“textbook"	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠViner’s	 ﾠ(1950)	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠanalysis:	 ﾠConsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠA	 ﾠand	 ﾠB,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠW.	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠour	 ﾠ“home"	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
produces	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrades	 ﾠit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠpartners	 ﾠB	 ﾠand	 ﾠW.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠB	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ W	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ assumed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ fixed	 ﾠ (but	 ﾠ
different)	 ﾠprice.	 ﾠInitially,	 ﾠimports	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠB	 ﾠand	 ﾠW	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐discriminatory	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠrestrictions:	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠB	 ﾠand	 ﾠW	 ﾠare	 ﾠequal.	 ﾠImagine	 ﾠnow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠA	 ﾠeliminates	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠB	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠits	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠW.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠ
reduction	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
W	 ﾠbe	 ﾠremoved	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠtempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠB	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstep	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠof	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
deliver	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠA	 ﾠa	 ﾠproportionate	 ﾠfraction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠViner	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot)	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠmove	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠimproving	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
A,	 ﾠViner	 ﾠdemonstrated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠto	 ﾠB	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFTA	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠfact	 ﾠworsen	 ﾠA’s	 ﾠwelfare.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Figures	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ II	 ﾠ illustrate	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ tariff	 ﾠ reform	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ respectively	 ﾠ welfare-ﾭ‐
enhancing	 ﾠand	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠworsening.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠy-ﾭ‐axes	 ﾠdenote	 ﾠprice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠx-ﾭ‐axes	 ﾠdenote	 ﾠ
quantities.	 ﾠ A M 	 ﾠdenotes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimport	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠcurve	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ B E 	 ﾠand	 ﾠ W E 	 ﾠdenote	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ B	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ W	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ willing	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ A’s	 ﾠ demand;	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
represent	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ curves	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ B	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ W	 ﾠ respectively.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ Figure	 ﾠ I,	 ﾠ B	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
assumed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠsupplier	 ﾠof	 ﾠA’s	 ﾠimport	 ﾠthan	 ﾠis	 ﾠW:	 ﾠ B E 	 ﾠis	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠbelow
W E ,	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠexport	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ B P 	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠW’s	 ﾠexport	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ W P .	 ﾠLet	 ﾠ“T "	 ﾠdenote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐discriminatory	 ﾠper-ﾭ‐unit	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠB	 ﾠand	 ﾠW.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrenders	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
tariff-ﾭ‐inclusive	 ﾠprice	 ﾠto	 ﾠimporters	 ﾠin	 ﾠA	 ﾠas	 ﾠ B PT + 	 ﾠand	 ﾠ W PT + 	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐discriminatory	 ﾠ tariff	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ place,	 ﾠ imports	 ﾠ initially	 ﾠ equal	 ﾠ 0 M 	 ﾠand	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
entirely	 ﾠimported	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠB.	 ﾠTariff	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠequal	 ﾠthe	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ
(1+2).	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ B	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ eliminated	 ﾠ preferentially,	 ﾠ imports	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ PT M .	 ﾠ
Imports	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠB	 ﾠ(since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimport	 ﾠprice	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠB	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠ B P ,	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
lower	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tariff-ﾭ‐inclusive	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ imports	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ W,	 ﾠ W PT + ).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ tariff	 ﾠ
preferences	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠto	 ﾠB	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvolume	 ﾠof	 ﾠimports.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
volume	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠexports	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠpurchased	 ﾠby	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
anyway	 ﾠ (i.e.,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ efficient	 ﾠ producer)	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
preferentially	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠis	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“trade	 ﾠcreation."	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠhere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
shown	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠimproving.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠ(consumer	 ﾠ
surplus)	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reduction	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ consumption	 ﾠ prices	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ B PT + 	 ﾠto	 ﾠ B P 	 ﾠ
equals	 ﾠthe	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ4).	 ﾠNo	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠearned	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
tariff	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠequals	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ(1+2).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠgain	 ﾠto	 ﾠA	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠ
reduction	 ﾠequals	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ(1+2+3+4)	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ(1+2)	 ﾠ=	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ(3+4),	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠnumber.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
trade-ﾭ‐creating	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠimproving.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠdemonstrating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠis	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠimproving	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhome	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠA,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartner	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠreceives	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠ
preference,	 ﾠ B,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ efficient	 ﾠ supplier	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ good.	 ﾠ Figure	 ﾠ II	 ﾠ reverses	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
assumption,	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠW,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠsupplier	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgood.	 ﾠ
W E 	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ B E .	 ﾠInitial	 ﾠimports	 ﾠare 0 M .	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
equal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ(1+2).	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠare	 ﾠeliminated	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠB,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠless	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠ
partner,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tariff-ﾭ‐inclusive	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ imports	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ W	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tariff-ﾭ‐
exclusive	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ B	 ﾠ (this	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ necessarily	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
drawn).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ“diverted"	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠW	 ﾠto	 ﾠB.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
equal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ(1+3)	 ﾠsince	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠnow	 ﾠpay	 ﾠa	 ﾠprice	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠ B P 	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgood.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠloss	 ﾠin	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(1+2).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠgain	 ﾠto	 ﾠA	 ﾠequals	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠ(3-ﾭ‐2),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
mayor	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpositive.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiverting	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠmay	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠreduction.7	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ preceding	 ﾠ discussion	 ﾠ leaves	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ implications.	 ﾠ First,	 ﾠ
liberalization	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠmay	 ﾠactually	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
degree	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠinefficient	 ﾠpartners).	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
intra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ volumes	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ automatically	 ﾠ indicate	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ improved	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ
outcome.	 ﾠ Finally,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ welfare	 ﾠ reducing	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ
distinguishes	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠliberalization.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ variety	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ contributions	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ economics	 ﾠ literature	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ examined	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiverting	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠagreements.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
paper,	 ﾠRomalis	 ﾠ(2007),	 ﾠinvestigates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠNAFTA	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠformed	 ﾠ
Canada-ﾭ‐US	 ﾠ Free	 ﾠ Trade	 ﾠ Agreement	 ﾠ (CUSFTA)	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ flows.	 ﾠ Romalis	 ﾠ finds	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
NAFTA	 ﾠand	 ﾠCUSFTA	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠvolumes,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
modest	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠprices	 ﾠand	 ﾠwelfare.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠhe	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠNAFTA	 ﾠand	 ﾠCUSFTA	 ﾠ
increased	 ﾠNorth	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠprotected	 ﾠsectors,	 ﾠimports	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠout,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversionary	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠOther	 ﾠ
papers	 ﾠanalyzing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠCUSFTA	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠClausing	 ﾠ(2001)	 ﾠand	 ﾠTrefler	 ﾠ
(2004).	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠcross	 ﾠsectional	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
papers	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ estimate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relative	 ﾠ magnitudes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ creation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ
diversion	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠby	 ﾠCUSFTA.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠdominated	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
diversion	 ﾠand	 ﾠTrefler	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠreports	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠoverall.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠused	 ﾠ“gravity”	 ﾠspecifications	 ﾠto	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
preferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠon	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠ
                                                 
7 The	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠissue	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ trade.	 ﾠ Preferential	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgood	 ﾠwas	 ﾠimported	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐discriminatory	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠ welfare;	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ diverts	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ instead	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ reduce	 ﾠ welfare.	 ﾠ
Subsequent	 ﾠ analysis	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ examples	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ welfare	 ﾠ improving	 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐diversion	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
welfare-ﾭ‐decreasing	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Viner.	 ﾠ However,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intuitive	 ﾠ appeal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ concepts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ creation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ diversion	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
ensured	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠuse	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreements,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠPanagariya	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠsurvey). 
 Magee	 ﾠ (2008)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Baier	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Bergstrand	 ﾠ (2007).	 ﾠ Using	 ﾠ panel	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
hundred	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠ(1980-ﾭ‐1998),	 ﾠMagee	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsmall,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠdominates	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
diversion	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠback	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ(1960-ﾭ‐2000),	 ﾠBaier	 ﾠand	 ﾠBergstrand	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
considering	 ﾠ explicitly	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ endogeneity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ (but	 ﾠ
excluding	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ diversion	 ﾠ effects)	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ
specification.	 ﾠBaier	 ﾠand	 ﾠBergstrand	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠendogeneity	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
crucial,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccounting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠendogeneity	 ﾠraises	 ﾠby	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfive	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠflows	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠTable	 ﾠII).	 ﾠ
Specifically,	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠis	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠto	 ﾠdouble	 ﾠin	 ﾠten	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ
after	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFTA.8	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠquantifying	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpreferences.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠsuffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠobtained.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠflows	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsmall.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother,	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠothers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
creation	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠmixed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠadditionally	 ﾠnoteworthy,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠand	 ﾠunusual	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠflows	 ﾠas	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠYeats	 ﾠ(1998)	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinvestigated	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠby	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
evaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠMERCOSUR.	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠto	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
MERCOSUR	 ﾠon	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpatters,	 ﾠYeats	 ﾠ(1998)	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠusing	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmeasures.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“regional	 ﾠorientation”	 ﾠindex	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠgood	 ﾠi)	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ share	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ region	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ share	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ
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 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠindicated	 ﾠbefore,	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠ
improving.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠascertained,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell. countries.	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
[(Within MERCOSUR exports of good i)/( Within MERCOSUR exports)]
 [(MERCOSUR exports of good i)/(Total MERCOSUR exports)]
i RO =
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“revealed	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠadvantage”	 ﾠ(of	 ﾠgood	 ﾠi)	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠgood	 ﾠin	 ﾠMERCOSUR’s	 ﾠexports	 ﾠto	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠworld	 ﾠexports	 ﾠ(exclusive	 ﾠof	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐MERCOSUR	 ﾠtrade).	 ﾠ	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
[(MERCOSUR exports of good i)/(Total MERCOSUR exports)]
 [(World exports of good i)/(Total World exports)]
i RCA =
	 ﾠ
Yeats	 ﾠthen	 ﾠcompares	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠgoods’	 ﾠregional	 ﾠorientation	 ﾠindex	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ1988	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ1994	 ﾠ(before	 ﾠand	 ﾠafter	 ﾠMERCOSUR)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrevealed	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠ
ranking.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠare	 ﾠstriking.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠhe	 ﾠnotes,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ regional	 ﾠ orientation	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ goods	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ revealed	 ﾠ comparative	 ﾠ
advantage	 ﾠ rankings.	 ﾠ Specifically,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ goods	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ largest	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ regional	 ﾠ orientation,	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ revealed	 ﾠ comparative	 ﾠ advantage	 ﾠ
indices	 ﾠabove	 ﾠunity	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠTable	 ﾠII).	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐MERCOSUR	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ goods	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ MERCOSUR	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ comparative	 ﾠ
advantage	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversionary	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠa	 ﾠcautionary	 ﾠnote	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdismissals	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ
theoretical	 ﾠconcern.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Bhagwati	 ﾠ (2008)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ discussed	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ variety	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ additional	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ surrounding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠXXIV	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
GATT	 ﾠ prevents	 ﾠ PTA	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ raising	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠ
countries,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ restriction	 ﾠ applies	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ MFN	 ﾠ tariff	 ﾠ bindings	 ﾠ agreed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠby	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠoften	 ﾠlie	 ﾠ
below	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbound	 ﾠtariffs.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisciplines	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠXXIV,	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐members	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbound	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ(thus	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworry	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion),	 ﾠas	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠwith	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠNAFTA.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠ	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ administered	 ﾠ protection,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ anti-ﾭ‐dumping	 ﾠ duties	 ﾠ
(which	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠin	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠin	 ﾠsection	 ﾠIV.3).	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“rules	 ﾠof	 ﾠorigin”	 ﾠin	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpurport	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorigin	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ qualify	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ preferences	 ﾠ offered	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ PTA,	 ﾠ raise	 ﾠ
protection	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppliers	 ﾠof	 ﾠintermediate	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠthus	 ﾠdivert	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmore	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠsuppliers	 ﾠof	 ﾠintermediates	 ﾠoutside.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
III.	 ﾠ1	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠTerms	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠ far,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ focused	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ discussion	 ﾠ largely	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ flows	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ welfare	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠundertaking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
liberalization.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠthis	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠby	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld’s	 ﾠexports	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠworsens	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld’s	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
seen	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubstitution	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠof	 ﾠreal	 ﾠincome	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠon	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠimports	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
members	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ latter	 ﾠ reflects	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ substitution	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ partner	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐member)	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠPTA,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcombine	 ﾠto	 ﾠlower	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsubstitution	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠeffect.9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Some	 ﾠindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠmay	 ﾠchange	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
practice	 ﾠis	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠChang	 ﾠand	 ﾠWinters	 ﾠ(2002)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
                                                 
9See	 ﾠMundell	 ﾠ(1964)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠif	 ﾠhow	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠextra-ﾭ‐union	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcomplicate	 ﾠ
matters	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtariff-ﾭ‐reducing	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠmay	 ﾠrise	 ﾠor	 ﾠfall	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpartner.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠby	 ﾠPanagariya	 ﾠ(1997)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠMERCOSUR	 ﾠ(specifically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexemption	 ﾠin	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBrazil	 ﾠ
provided	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ MERCOSUR	 ﾠ partners)	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ terms-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐trade	 ﾠ (export	 ﾠ prices)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreement.	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠworsen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠof	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
find.	 ﾠ They	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ declines	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ prices	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Brazil’s	 ﾠ major	 ﾠ
trading	 ﾠ partners	 ﾠ (the	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ States,	 ﾠ Japan,	 ﾠ Germany	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Korea)	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ
MERCOSUR.	 ﾠ (See	 ﾠ Figure	 ﾠ YYY).	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ welfare	 ﾠ losses	 ﾠ sustained	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
excluded	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ–	 ﾠamounting	 ﾠto	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠten	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexports	 ﾠto	 ﾠBrazil.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠis	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠto	 ﾠlose	 ﾠ
somewhere	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 550	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ 600	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ dollars	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ 5.5	 ﾠ billion	 ﾠ
dollars	 ﾠwith	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ170	 ﾠand	 ﾠ236	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠdollars	 ﾠon	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ2	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠdollars.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
IV.	 ﾠPreferential	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠAgreements	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMultilateral	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠSystem	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
IV.	 ﾠ1	 ﾠExpansion	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠBlocs	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Stimulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠresults	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠambiguous	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpreferences,	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
design	 ﾠof	 ﾠnecessarily-ﾭ‐welfare-ﾭ‐improving	 ﾠPTAs.	 ﾠA	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠresult	 ﾠstated	 ﾠindependently	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠKemp	 ﾠ(1964)	 ﾠand	 ﾠVanek	 ﾠ(1965)	 ﾠand	 ﾠproved	 ﾠsubsequently	 ﾠby	 ﾠOhyama	 ﾠ(1972)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Kemp	 ﾠand	 ﾠWan	 ﾠ(1976)	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠwelfare-ﾭ‐improving	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠCUs.	 ﾠ
Starting	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbarriers,	 ﾠif	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠfreeze	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnet	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠvector	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
set	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠand	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ(implying	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠCU),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunion	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠimproves	 ﾠ
(weakly)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfall.10	 ﾠThe	 ﾠKemp-ﾭ‐Wan-ﾭ‐Ohyama	 ﾠ
                                                 
10	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKemp-ﾭ‐Wan	 ﾠtheorem	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠfixing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcombined,	 ﾠnet	 ﾠextra-ﾭ‐union	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠvector	 ﾠof	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠat	 ﾠits	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐union	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠguaranteed	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
original	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠwelfare.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ welfare	 ﾠ improving	 ﾠ CUs	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ automatically	 ﾠ extend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ FTAs	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ
member-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠvectors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠFTAs	 ﾠimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐prices	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
differ	 ﾠacross	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠPanagariya	 ﾠand	 ﾠKrishna	 ﾠ(2002)	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠnevertheless,	 ﾠ
recently	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠwelfare-ﾭ‐improving	 ﾠ
FTAs	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ complete	 ﾠ analogy	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Kemp-ﾭ‐Wan	 ﾠ CU.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Taken	 ﾠ together,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
contributions	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠcould	 ﾠexpand	 ﾠ
sequentially	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠmonotonically	 ﾠraising	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠalong	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠwill	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠexpand	 ﾠsuccessively	 ﾠto	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠall	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠnations?	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ	 ﾠWill	 ﾠ
preferential	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ prove	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ quicker	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ efficient	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ getting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
global	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ process?12	 ﾠ	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
interaction	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠare	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠRecently,	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
literature	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠ
(political	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic)	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Levy	 ﾠ(1997)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠvoting	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠ income	 ﾠ distributional	 ﾠ changes	 ﾠ brought	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ
degrees	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠopposition)	 ﾠby	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
bilateral	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpreclude	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠfeasible	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
crucial	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠvoting	 ﾠblocs)	 ﾠenjoyed	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bilateral	 ﾠ agreement	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ trade.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
                                                                                                                                               
countries	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ adversely	 ﾠ affected.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ PTA	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ
vector,	 ﾠimplying	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠKemp-ﾭ‐Wan-ﾭ‐Ohyama	 ﾠ
design,	 ﾠby	 ﾠfreezing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠvector	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion,	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
sidestep	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠand	 ﾠambiguities	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠPTAs.	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠin	 ﾠBhagwati	 ﾠ(1993)	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠBhagwati	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“dynamic	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐path	 ﾠ
question”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠThis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“stumbling-ﾭ‐bloc	 ﾠversus	 ﾠbuilding-ﾭ‐
bloc”	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphrasing	 ﾠof	 ﾠBhagwati	 ﾠ(1993). Grossman	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Helpman	 ﾠ (1995)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Krishna	 ﾠ (1998)	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ modeled	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠin	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry’s	 ﾠentry	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
PTA,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalytic	 ﾠframeworks	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetail,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
similar	 ﾠand	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠconclusion,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdivert	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠwin	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ support.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ respond	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
conflicting	 ﾠ pressures	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ exporting	 ﾠ sectors,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ gain	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ lower	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ
barriers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartner,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠimport-ﾭ‐competing	 ﾠsectors,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlower	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠ barriers	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ home,	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ deciding	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ enter	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ PTA.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ
Krishna	 ﾠ(1998)	 ﾠargues,	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠburden	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgain	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
member-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠoff	 ﾠmember-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠimport-ﾭ‐competing	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠand	 ﾠonto	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠproducers,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠclout	 ﾠinside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ
Krishna	 ﾠ (1998)	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ argues	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ lower	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ incentives	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ
subsequent	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ−	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ diverting	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ
oppose	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠreform	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠaway	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgains	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
preferential	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠenjoyed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdiverted	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠ circumstances,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ incentive	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
completely	 ﾠ eliminated.	 ﾠ Both	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ papers	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ discussed	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ argue	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
bilateral	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ impede	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Ornelas	 ﾠ (2005a)	 ﾠ reconsiders	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ preceding	 ﾠ analyses	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ determined	 ﾠ endogenously	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ historically	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ (as	 ﾠ
implicitly	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠby	 ﾠGrossman	 ﾠand	 ﾠHelpman	 ﾠ(1995)	 ﾠand	 ﾠKrishna	 ﾠ(1998).	 ﾠThrough	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleakage	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠto	 ﾠpartner	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ changes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ difficulty	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ redistributing	 ﾠ surplus	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ
policies	 ﾠunder	 ﾠan	 ﾠFTA,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠfinds,	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠto	 ﾠGrossman	 ﾠand	 ﾠHelpman	 ﾠ(1995)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Krishna	 ﾠ(1998),	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠenhancing	 ﾠFTAs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠ
viable	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ predicts	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ fall	 ﾠ subsequent	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
formation	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠFTA.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠOrnelas	 ﾠ(2005b)	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlobbies	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠto	 ﾠlobby	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠregime,	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠviability	 ﾠof	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠFTAs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Baldwin	 ﾠ (1995),	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ hand,	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ argued	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ PTA	 ﾠ expansion	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
“domino"	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ−	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbloc	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠothers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
join	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ (as	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ gain	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ access	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increasingly	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ markets).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ
combination	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ“Juggernaut”	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠcuts	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠ
momentum	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization,13	 ﾠhe	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠmay	 ﾠlead	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
multilateral	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Yi	 ﾠ (1996),	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ advances	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ endogenous	 ﾠ coalition	 ﾠ theory, 14 	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ compared	 ﾠ
theoretical	 ﾠ outcomes	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ regimes,	 ﾠ “open”	 ﾠ membership	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
“unanimous”	 ﾠmembership.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠopen	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠrules	 ﾠany	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
joining	 ﾠan	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠis	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠunder	 ﾠunanimous	 ﾠmembership,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠmay	 ﾠjoin	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠall	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠagree	 ﾠto	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmember.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠare	 ﾠstriking.	 ﾠGlobal	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠopen	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠrules	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠunder	 ﾠunanimous	 ﾠ
membership.	 ﾠIntuitively,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠsome	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠunion	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ expand	 ﾠ membership	 ﾠ (for	 ﾠ reasons	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ discussed	 ﾠ before),	 ﾠ
outsiders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhad	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiverted	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwill	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
join	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠunion	 ﾠexpands	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠis	 ﾠdiverted	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
them.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠunanimous	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠrules	 ﾠwill	 ﾠstop	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbloc	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ
before	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠis	 ﾠreached,	 ﾠopen	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠwill	 ﾠaccelerate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ global	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ trade.	 ﾠ While	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ rigorously	 ﾠ
demonstrated	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ theoretical	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ assumed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Yi	 ﾠ
(1996),	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠappeal.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠopen	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠrules	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbring	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
closer	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ global	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ seen	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ variety	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ
                                                 
13	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ view,	 ﾠ reciprocity	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ WTO	 ﾠ implies	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ initial	 ﾠ tariff	 ﾠ cuts	 ﾠ create	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ
momentum	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcuts	 ﾠby	 ﾠaltering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠlobbies	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠimport	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠlobbies.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠBaldwin	 ﾠ(2004).	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠSaggi	 ﾠand	 ﾠYildiz	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠ2009)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinnovative	 ﾠformulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠ
agreements	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠendogenous	 ﾠcoalitions	 ﾠand	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠasymmetries	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠdetermination. formulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem.15,16,17	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhighlighted	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
forces	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ oppose	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ
liberalization.	 ﾠWhich	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠforces	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠevaluations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlinkages	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠnext.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
IV.	 ﾠ2	 ﾠTariff	 ﾠPreferences	 ﾠand	 ﾠMultilateral	 ﾠLiberalization	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠEmpirical	 ﾠEvidence	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠinterplay	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠand	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
studied	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ papers	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ literature.	 ﾠ Estevadeordal	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ (2008)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
studied	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠon	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
ten	 ﾠLatin	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠby	 ﾠasking	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
imports	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ (defined	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ISIC	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ Digit-ﾭ‐level)	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ related	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
corresponding	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ
They	 ﾠfind	 ﾠno	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠFTAs	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠLatin	 ﾠAmerica	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠor	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠcuts,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfind	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ faster	 ﾠ decline	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ tariffs. 18	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ CUs	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ Latin	 ﾠ America,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ
preferential	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠany	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠtariffs.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠOpen	 ﾠ membership	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ appears	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ complement	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ integration	 ﾠ
process.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠopen	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠin	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
imply	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ discrimination	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ eliminated	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ outsiders	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ still	 ﾠ face	 ﾠ
discriminatory	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbarriers.	 ﾠNor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠopen	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠa	 ﾠfaster	 ﾠpath	 ﾠto	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbloc	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
existence	 ﾠhas	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠEntry	 ﾠinto	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠblocs	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠslow	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
carefully	 ﾠnegotiated	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠPanagariya	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠCanada-ﾭ‐U.S.	 ﾠFree	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠago	 ﾠand,	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠNAFTA,	 ﾠits	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgrown	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠthree	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar.”	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠmultilateralism	 ﾠon	 ﾠregionalism	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature.	 ﾠEthier	 ﾠ(1998)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠFreund	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠboth	 ﾠview	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
consequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠFreund	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠ
argues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠare	 ﾠlow,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdangers	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠare	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ creation	 ﾠ remain.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ increases	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ likelihood	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐sustaining	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ
agreements.	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ papers	 ﾠ described	 ﾠ above,	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ contributions	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ literature	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ
Aghion,	 ﾠ Antras	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Helpman	 ﾠ (2007),	 ﾠ Bagwell	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Staiger	 ﾠ (1997a,	 ﾠ 1997b),	 ﾠ Cadot,	 ﾠ DeMelo	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Olarreaga	 ﾠ(1999),	 ﾠMcLaren	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠand	 ﾠSaggi	 ﾠ(2006).	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠBohara,	 ﾠGawande	 ﾠand	 ﾠSanguinetti	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfind	 ﾠlinks	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
declining	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠin	 ﾠMERCOSUR.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Differently,	 ﾠ Limao	 ﾠ (2006)	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ
undertaken	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ US	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Uruguay	 ﾠ round	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ related	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ
liberalization	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUruguay	 ﾠround.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠexamines	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠ
cuts	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Uruguay	 ﾠ round	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ cross	 ﾠ section	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ products	 ﾠ (at	 ﾠ HS	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
disaggregation)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ asks	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ cuts	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ lower	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ products	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ regional	 ﾠ
preference	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠor	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠwith	 ﾠEstevadeordal	 ﾠat	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
(2008),	 ﾠ his	 ﾠ findings	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ argument	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ preferences	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ indeed	 ﾠ
impede	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠprogress;	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠcuts	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠin	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ preferences.	 ﾠ Karacaovali	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Limao	 ﾠ (2008)	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ repeated	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠfound	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠresults.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Tovar	 ﾠ (2010)	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ disaggregated	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ HS	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ examine	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠsigned	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
Costa	 ﾠRica	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDominican	 ﾠRepublic,	 ﾠEl	 ﾠSalvador,	 ﾠGuatemala,	 ﾠHonduras,	 ﾠNicaragua	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2004	 ﾠ(CAFTA-ﾭ‐DR).	 ﾠFocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfour	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfour	 ﾠ
Central	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠin	 ﾠforce	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2006:	 ﾠ
El	 ﾠSalvador,	 ﾠGuatemala,	 ﾠHonduras	 ﾠand	 ﾠNicaragua,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
raised	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠlowered	 ﾠby	 ﾠless)	 ﾠin	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠreductions	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠtariffs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠof	 ﾠMFN	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠand	 ﾠtariff	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
yield	 ﾠan	 ﾠunambiguous	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠimpede	 ﾠ
progress	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ tariff	 ﾠ liberalization.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ turn	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ next	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐tariff	 ﾠbarriers.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
IV.	 ﾠ3	 ﾠNon-ﾭ‐Tariff	 ﾠBarriers	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Bhagwati	 ﾠ (1993)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Bhagwati	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Panagariya	 ﾠ (1996)	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ argued	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
additional	 ﾠworry	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠresort	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaggressive	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠadministered	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
member	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠas	 ﾠadministered	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠelastic	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanipulable	 ﾠby	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠplayers.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠPTA’s	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠdiversionary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠendogenous	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠmade	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
nevertheless	 ﾠyield	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiversionary	 ﾠoutcome.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ innovative	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ study,	 ﾠ Prusa	 ﾠ (2011),	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ evaluated	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ
empirically	 ﾠby	 ﾠexamining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠremedy	 ﾠactions	 ﾠ(specifically,	 ﾠantidumping	 ﾠ
duties)	 ﾠby	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠworldwide	 ﾠantidumping	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ
1980	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ includes	 ﾠ nearly	 ﾠ 5000	 ﾠ antidumping	 ﾠ cases	 ﾠ initiated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ WTO	 ﾠ members	 ﾠ
belonging	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ PTA.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ study	 ﾠ proceeds	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ steps.	 ﾠ First,	 ﾠ Prusa	 ﾠ
examines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠantidumping	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠinitiated	 ﾠby	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ(“intra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠfilings”)	 ﾠis	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠimporting	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomparing	 ﾠtrends	 ﾠin	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠfilings	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠand	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTA.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠstep,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠtrends	 ﾠin	 ﾠantidumping	 ﾠ
filing	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠtrends	 ﾠin	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠfilings	 ﾠare	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtrends	 ﾠin	 ﾠfilings	 ﾠby	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠ
members	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠstriking.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠ
period,	 ﾠ58	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfilings	 ﾠare	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠ42	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpost	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠ90	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ10	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠwere	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠPrusa	 ﾠnotes,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠresults	 ﾠ“clearly	 ﾠraise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecter	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠdiversion	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion”	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠ“tariff	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmight	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdiversion”,	 ﾠit	 ﾠappears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“other	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscrimination”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
IV.	 ﾠ4	 ﾠIntra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠand	 ﾠExtra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠvolumes	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsteady	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠraises	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠextra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠstill	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠHave	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ organized	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ blocs	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ extent	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
insignificant?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠTable	 ﾠIII	 ﾠlists	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠand	 ﾠextra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠflows	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
prominent	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreements.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠshares	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexport	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ import	 ﾠ shares	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ standing	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ 60	 ﾠ percent.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ NAFTA,	 ﾠ intra	 ﾠ –PTA	 ﾠ
exports	 ﾠtake	 ﾠup	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠexports,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠimports	 ﾠ
amount	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ smaller	 ﾠ fraction	 ﾠ (33	 ﾠ percent)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ overall	 ﾠ imports.	 ﾠ Next,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
ASEAN.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheavy	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIntra-ﾭ‐ASEAN	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ literature	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ PTAs,	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ reference	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ volumes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
“fragmented”	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ ASEAN	 ﾠ serving	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ possible	 ﾠ motivation	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ
integration	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠASEAN,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠevident	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠASEAN	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ(over	 ﾠ75	 ﾠpercent)	 ﾠ
takes	 ﾠplace	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠExtra	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠis	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
80	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ90	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
majority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠshares	 ﾠ
(and	 ﾠthus	 ﾠextra-ﾭ‐PTA	 ﾠshares	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell)	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠPTAs.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ initiatives	 ﾠ involving	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rest	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠmost	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
V.	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠand	 ﾠDeep	 ﾠIntegration?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Recently,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbegun	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmotivation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlowering	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbarriers,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠ
instead	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ vehicles	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ undertaking	 ﾠ “deeper”	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ integration	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ achieve	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠ harmonization	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ partner	 ﾠ countries.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ
dimensions	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠharmonization	 ﾠis	 ﾠsought	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠboth	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
currently	 ﾠ fall	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ mandate	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ WTO	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
commitment	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ WTO	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ (such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ improvement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ customs	 ﾠ
administration	 ﾠand	 ﾠrules	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠprocurement)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠ
fall	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠmeasures,	 ﾠ
labor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠinnovations	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠrights).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠTo	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠPTAs,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠdata	 ﾠset	 ﾠ
recently	 ﾠcompiled	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠits	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠpublication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠReview)	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠcodifies	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠhundred	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠnotified	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
WTO,	 ﾠand	 ﾠadditionally	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠdeemed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠ
enforceable.19	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠIV	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠlist	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠareas	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠin	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠbreakdown	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠareas	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfall	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
WTO’s	 ﾠ mandate.	 ﾠ Table	 ﾠ IV	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ indicates	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fraction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ (of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 131	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ
covered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠset)	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠarea	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
text	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ PTA	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fraction	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ included	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ deemed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠenforceable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠone.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
WTO	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠand	 ﾠmany	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠ
enforceable	 ﾠstatus.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠover	 ﾠ65	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdatabase	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠ
enforceable	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠcustoms	 ﾠadministration,	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠ50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠ
include	 ﾠprohibitions	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠand	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠover	 ﾠ50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠof	 ﾠantidumping	 ﾠduties.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsmaller,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠstill	 ﾠsignificant,	 ﾠfraction,	 ﾠ
include	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠof	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠ
property	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠmeasures.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfall	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO	 ﾠmandates	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdeemed	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠenforceable	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠare	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠnumber.20	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠ4	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPTAs	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠenforceable	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
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 ﾠAs	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ WTR	 ﾠ 2011,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ set,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ codification	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠenforceability	 ﾠof	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠdomains	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmethodology	 ﾠof	 ﾠHorn,	 ﾠMavroidis	 ﾠand	 ﾠSapir	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠSee	 ﾠWTR	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
details.	 ﾠ 
20	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTR	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠnotes,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠterminology	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠPTA	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠa	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠ
“establishes	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ legally	 ﾠ enforceable	 ﾠ obligation”	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ matter	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ interpretation.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ event,	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ
enforceability	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimply	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠenforceability	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“political	 ﾠ
factors,	 ﾠresource	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐legal	 ﾠconsiderations”.	 ﾠ anti-ﾭ‐corruption	 ﾠmeasures,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠregulation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ
percent	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ environmental	 ﾠ regulations.	 ﾠ Regulations	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
movement	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ(specifically	 ﾠ
accession	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠtreaties	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGATS)	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
40	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠand	 ﾠ34	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreferenced	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvast	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠPTAs.	 ﾠThis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
skepticism	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ PTAs,	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ average,	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ gone	 ﾠ beyond	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
possibilities	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO.	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenforceable	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐border	 ﾠ
investment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠyield	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠflow	 ﾠof	 ﾠinvestments)	 ﾠremains	 ﾠan	 ﾠopen	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
future	 ﾠresearch.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Separately,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbegun	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfragmentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠregionally	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“deeper”	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠWTR	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠdiscussion).21	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
argument	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ gaining	 ﾠ currency	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ quarters,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ production	 ﾠ
fragmentation	 ﾠshould	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠ
liberalization.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠintermediate	 ﾠgood	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ lie	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ jurisdictional	 ﾠ boundaries	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ
agreement	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠof	 ﾠintermediates	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠvary	 ﾠfaster	 ﾠthan	 ﾠany	 ﾠcountry's	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠsign	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠ
agreements.	 ﾠ Furthermore,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ fragmentation	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ identification	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
origin	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ goods,	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ preferences	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ suitably	 ﾠ granted,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ major	 ﾠ
challenge.22	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ practical	 ﾠ matter,	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ designed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ fragmented	 ﾠ
production	 ﾠnetworks,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠconcentration	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠas	 ﾠmany	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠare	 ﾠregional	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTR	 ﾠ
                                                 
21	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfragmentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠwell	 ﾠdocumented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ
Varian	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠmusic	 ﾠplayer,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIpod,	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠwell	 ﾠover	 ﾠ400	 ﾠparts	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠoriginate	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠfinally	 ﾠassembled	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexcellent	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠby	 ﾠBhagwati	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠpp	 ﾠ61-ﾭ‐70)	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“who	 ﾠis	 ﾠwho”	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ identification	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ “true”	 ﾠ origin	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ goods	 ﾠ (i.e.,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ importable	 ﾠ truly	 ﾠ
originates	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpartner	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠor	 ﾠelsewhere)	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
preferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠtrade.  2011	 ﾠ notes,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ share	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ intra-ﾭ‐regional	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Europe	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ remained	 ﾠ
roughly	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠat	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ73	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ1990	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠAsia's	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐
regional	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrisen	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ42	 ﾠto	 ﾠ52	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠ
North	 ﾠAmerica's	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐regional	 ﾠ	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠshares	 ﾠrose	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ41	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1990	 ﾠto	 ﾠ56	 ﾠ
percent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠand	 ﾠfell	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠ48	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ event,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ obvious	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ achievement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “deep	 ﾠ integration”	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
regional	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠeither	 ﾠa	 ﾠregional	 ﾠor	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠperspective.	 ﾠ
Common	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠpreferences,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠcostly	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠwide	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠof	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ involving	 ﾠ environmental	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ standards,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
instance).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠNorth-ﾭ‐South	 ﾠagreements,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠresources	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠsectoral	 ﾠ
lobbies	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ North	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ shift	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ direction	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ closer	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠand	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSouth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠregional	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠmay	 ﾠinhibit	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠvary	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠregional	 ﾠones	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠto	 ﾠswitching	 ﾠ
standards.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ conceivable	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ regional	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ follow	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠ templates	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ harmonization	 ﾠ difficult,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ regional	 ﾠ
level23	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠon	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠignored.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠprohibition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠantidumping	 ﾠduties	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
partner	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠmay	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠantidumping	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐members	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠPrusa	 ﾠ(discussed	 ﾠearlier)	 ﾠsuggests.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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23	 ﾠThe	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠof	 ﾠoverlapping	 ﾠand	 ﾠcriss-ﾭ‐crossed	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠagreements,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdiffering	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
rules,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠorigin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpermit	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠ
duty	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtreatment,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfamously	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠby	 ﾠJagdish	 ﾠBhagwati	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinefficient	 ﾠ“spaghetti-ﾭ‐
bowl”	 ﾠof	 ﾠPTAs.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠBhagwati	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwittily	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout,	 ﾠevolving	 ﾠthese	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
multilateral	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠturning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspaghetti-ﾭ‐bowl	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠuniform	 ﾠlasagna,	 ﾠa	 ﾠtask	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccomplished	 ﾠusing	 ﾠflat	 ﾠpasta	 ﾠ(identical	 ﾠtemplates	 ﾠon	 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐unrelated	 ﾠissues).	 ﾠRecent	 ﾠ
experience,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠAsia	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠUS-ﾭ‐led	 ﾠTrans	 ﾠPacific	 ﾠPartnership	 ﾠ(TPP)	 ﾠinitiative	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
integration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcollided	 ﾠwith	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠvision	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreassuring	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠcount.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDoha	 ﾠround	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
multilateral	 ﾠ barriers	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ developing	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ erodes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ preference	 ﾠ margins	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalready	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠ markets.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ instance,	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Everything	 ﾠ But	 ﾠ Arms	 ﾠ (EBA)	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ
signed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠpermitted	 ﾠgranting	 ﾠduty-ﾭ‐free	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠimports	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ49	 ﾠLDCs,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠarms	 ﾠand	 ﾠammunitions,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
quantitative	 ﾠrestrictions	 ﾠ(with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexception	 ﾠof	 ﾠbananas,	 ﾠsugar	 ﾠand	 ﾠrice	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠ
period).	 ﾠ Multilateral	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EU	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ erode	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ
access	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLDCs	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Amiti	 ﾠand	 ﾠRomalis	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠerosion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
Doha	 ﾠand	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlowering	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
net	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ access	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ developing	 ﾠ countries.	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ preference	 ﾠ
erosion	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDoha	 ﾠround,	 ﾠLDCs	 ﾠ
concerned	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠaccess,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠ
sector,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠround	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠother	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
exporters,	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ prior	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ access	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ markets,	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠgain	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠare	 ﾠnet	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠof	 ﾠfood	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠround	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ net	 ﾠ importers	 ﾠ food,	 ﾠ divisions	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ developing	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprior	 ﾠpreferential	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Two	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠconfirm	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfears.	 ﾠFrancois,	 ﾠHoekman	 ﾠand	 ﾠManchin	 ﾠ(2005)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Limao	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Olarreaga	 ﾠ (2005)	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ estimate	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ losses	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠin	 ﾠAfrica	 ﾠand	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠAsia	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠerosion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferences.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠ
suggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBangladesh	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠerosion	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ200	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠdollars	 ﾠannually).	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠforecast	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠlose	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠfractions	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠGDP,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠMalawi	 ﾠ(8	 ﾠpercent),	 ﾠLesotho	 ﾠ
(2.7	 ﾠpercent)	 ﾠand	 ﾠSao	 ﾠTome	 ﾠand	 ﾠPrincipe	 ﾠ(1.6	 ﾠpercent).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠcounter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠliberalization	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠerosion,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠsolutions,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompensate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlosers,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠcontemplated.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ“aid	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtrade”.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠaid	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠin	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlosses.	 ﾠLeaving	 ﾠ
aside	 ﾠany	 ﾠworries	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠmay	 ﾠgenerate,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtune	 ﾠof	 ﾠapproximately	 ﾠ500	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠUSD	 ﾠannually	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠPage,	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠaid	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
available,	 ﾠLDCs	 ﾠcould	 ﾠworry	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiverted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
intended	 ﾠforms	 ﾠaid.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠa	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠfund	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinanced,	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠand	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaid	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠalready	 ﾠunder	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠricher	 ﾠnations.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Another	 ﾠ possibility,	 ﾠ suggested	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Limao	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Olarreaga	 ﾠ (2005),	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tariff	 ﾠ
preferences	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreplaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠimport	 ﾠsubsidies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠmagnitude,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠLDC’s	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠ preferences	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ eroded,	 ﾠ nevertheless	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ earnings	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
before.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠappeal,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠruns	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠreplaces	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ distortions	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ WTO	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ (even	 ﾠ though	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
transformation	 ﾠwill	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠbe	 ﾠPareto	 ﾠimproving).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ preference	 ﾠ erosion,	 ﾠ delaying	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ gradually	 ﾠ liberalizing	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsuggested.	 ﾠLawrence	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Rosito	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcombines	 ﾠdelayed	 ﾠ
liberalization	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ compensation	 ﾠ mechanism;	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ propose	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠa	 ﾠtemporary	 ﾠand	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠwaiver	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
liberalization	 ﾠ obligations	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ categories	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
additional	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠso	 ﾠraised	 ﾠare	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠas	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠerosion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ ideas	 ﾠ discussed	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ options	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ WTO	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
consider.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceivable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠeventual	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDoha	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcombine	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ proposals.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ experience	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠ Doha	 ﾠ nonetheless	 ﾠ suggests	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ subtle,	 ﾠ yet	 ﾠ important,	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
preferential	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ impacted	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ portends	 ﾠpoorly	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ rounds	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ reach	 ﾠ beyond	 ﾠ agriculture	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aim	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ unwind	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
preferences	 ﾠenjoyed	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ





The	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠone.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠsharp	 ﾠconclusions	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
hard	 ﾠto	 ﾠreach,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠa	 ﾠmultilateralist	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠin	 ﾠevaluating	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ light	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ trends	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ system.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
challenged	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ideas	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ efficient	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ multilateral	 ﾠ
approaches	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ achieving	 ﾠ genuine	 ﾠ liberalization	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ PTAs	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
uniformly	 ﾠ enabled	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ “deep	 ﾠ integration”	 ﾠ claimed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ proponents	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ preferential	 ﾠ
trade.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠremain	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO.	 ﾠ
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MFN 0 0 0 44.8 4.9 40 53.9 4874
EU-intra 63.7 9.4 54.3 0 0 0 34.4 3807
 
Reciprocal Regimes 43.7 5.8 37.9 7.6 1 6.6 47 2803
NAFTA 60.9 6.3 54.7 0.1 0 0 38.2 912
EU - Switzerland 56.9 3.9 53 1.3 0.5 0.8 41 261
 
ASEAN* 20.1 4 16 3.6 0.3 3.3 72.9 141
EU-Turkey 78.4 15.2 63.2 0.9 0.5 0.4 20 141
EU-Mexico 51.2 13.5 37.7 0.9 0.6 0.3 43.2 58
 
 
Non-Reciprocal Regimes 17.6 1 16.6 26.3 5.4 21 55.6 2067
EU-GSP 13.3 0.1 13.2 23 5.7 17.3 63.4 1012
US-GSP 8.3 0.2 8.1 62.4 5.6 56.8 28.8 258
US-AGOA 90.1 1.5 88.6 0.1 0 0 9.9 84
 
Source; World Trade Review 2011
Preferential Trade Non-Preferential TradeTable II: Regional Orientation of Trade and Comparative Advantage ­ MERCOSUR
Product Exports (Thousands USD) Exports (Thousands USD) Regional Orientation Regional Orientation ∆ Regional Orientation Comparative Advantage
1998 1994 1988 1994
 
Nonalcoholic beverages 349 26238 2.35 48.47 46.12 0.05
Lead   642 219 3.03 25.42 22.39 0
Prepared dairy 23495 204019 4.31 22.49 18.17 0.13
Nonwheat meal or Flour 4 954 0.05 17.26 17.21 0.04
Perfumes and Cosmetics 4766 86282 5.22 13.37 8.16 0.14
Wheat meal or Flour 65 35051 0.22 5.67 5.44 1.08
Cork manufactures 18 721 1.18 6.3 5.13 0.05
Preserved vegetables 23404 48745 17.66 22.61 4.95 0.13
Articles of Paper 15763 72249 2.16 7.1 4.93 0.2
Nonmotor road vehicles 3118 35854 2.23 6.88 4.65 0.13
Alcoholic beverages 4137 81671 1.87 6.48 4.61 0.19
Agricultural machinery 39608 121294 2.08 5.88 3.81 0.45
Domestic electrical machinery 12568 97322 2.19 5.94 3.76 0.23
Road motor vehicles 206996 2112750 1.25 4.42 3.17 0.45
Materials of rubber 3636 30780 3.13 6.26 3.13 0.32
Glassware   45017 2.21 5.09 2.88 0.38
Synthetic fibers 13381 21170 6.28 9.14 2.87 0.11
Rice (glazed) 22583 148079 9.28 11.65 2.37 1.03
Lace and Ribbons 1386 13157 3.56 5.86 2.29 0.22
Food preparations 7727 45412 2.1 4.35 2.25 0.28
Source: Yeats (1998)Preferential Trade Agreement
Export Import Export Import Export Import
ANDEAN Community 94 93 7 8 93 92
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 966 929 25 24 75 76
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) 2043 1897 11 19 89 81
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) 26 29 16 12 84 88
Central American Common Market  (CACM) 25 44 24 11 76 89
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 57 115 10 5 90 95
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 693 456 18 27 82 73
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 71 58 8 9 92 91
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 374 279 1 1 99 99
 
European Union (27) 5806 6083 67 60 33 40
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) 1437 1486 19 22 81 78
Gulf Cooperation Council 704 366 2 7 98 93
Latin American Integration Association 814 760 16 18 84 82
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 2047 2882 49 33 51 67
Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA) 892 607 6 11 94 89
South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) 211 374 6 2 94 98
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 278 249 17 18 83 82
Source: World Trade Review 2011
World (Billions USD) Intra-PTA Share Extra-PTA Share
Table III: Intra-PTA and Extra-PTA Trade (2008)Provision Not Mentioned
Fraction of PTAs
FTA Industrial Tariff liberalization on industrial goods; elimination of non-tariff measures 27 73
FTA Agriculture Tariff liberalization on agriculture goods; elimination of non-tariff measures 27 73
Customs Provision of information; publication on the Internet of new laws and regulations; training 35 65
Export Taxes Elimination of export taxes 52 48
SPS Affirmation of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement on SPS; harmonization of SPS measures 69 21
TBT Affirmation of rights and obligations under WTO Agreement on TBT; harmonization of regulations; 67 30
STE Establishment of an independent competition authority; nondiscrimination regarding production and marketing condition;  64 34
AD Retention of Antidumping rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement (Art. VI GATT). 40 53
CVM Retention of Countervailing measures rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement (Art VI GATT) 49 44
State Aid Assessment of anticompetitive behaviour; annual reporting on the value and distribution of state aid given 57 39
Public Procurement Progressive liberalisation; national treatment and/or non-discrimination principle; specification of public procurement regime 70 27
TRIMs Provisions concerning requirements for local content and export performance of FDI 69 31
GATS Liberalisation of trade in services 61 39
TRIPs Harmonisation of standards; enforcement; national treatment, most-favoured nation treatment 56 43
Anti-Corruption Criminal offence measures in matters affecting international trade and investment 96 4
Competition Policy Harmonisation of competition laws; establishment of an independent competition authority 52 30
Environmental  Laws Development of environmental standards; enforcement of national environmental laws 85 11
IPR Accession to international treaties not referenced in the TRIPs Agreement 62 34
Investment  Legal frameworks; Harmonisation; National treatment; mechanism for the settlement of disputes 69 30
Labour Market Regulation Regulation of the national labour market; affirmation of  ILO commitments; enforcement 85 12
Movement of Capital Liberalisation of capital movement; prohibition of new restrictions 60 40
Consumer Protection Harmonisation of consumer protection laws; exchange of information and experts; training 95 4
Data Protection Exchange of information and experts; joint projects 95 3
Agriculture Technical assistance to conduct modernisation projects; exchange of information 93 5
Approximation of Legislation Application of EC legislation in national legislation 95 5
Audio Visual Promotion of the industry; encouragement of co-production 100 0
Civil Protection Implementation of harmonised rules 100 0
Innovation Policies Participation in framework programmes; promotion of technology transfers 99 1
Cultural Cooperation Promotion of joint initiatives and local culture 98 1
Economic Policy Dialogue Exchange of ideas and opinions; joint studies 98 1
Education and Training Measures to improve the general level of education 94 3
Energy Exchange of information; technology transfer; joint studies 94 5
Financial Assistance Set of rules guiding the granting and administration of financial assistance 95 5
Health Monitoring of diseases; development of health information systems; exchange of information 99 0
Human Rights Respect for human rights 100 0
Illegal Immigration Conclusion of re-admission agreements; prevention and control of illegal immigration 98 2
Illicit Drugs Treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts; joint projects on prevention of consumption;  100 0
Industrial Cooperation Assistance in conducting modernisation projects; facilitation and access to credit to finance 96 3
Information Society Exchange of information; dissemination of new technologies; training 96 3
Mining Exchange of information and experience; development of joint initiatives 98 1
Money Laundering Harmonisation of standards; technical and administrative assistance 100 0
Nuclear Safety Development of laws and regulations; supervision of the transportation of radioactive materials 100 0
Political Dialogue Convergence of the parties’ positions on international issues 100 0
Public Administration Technical assistance; exchange of information; joint projects; Training 100 0
Regional Cooperation Promotion of regional cooperation; technical assistance programmes 97 2
Research and Technology Joint research projects; exchange of researchers; development of public-private partnership 93 5
SME Technical assistance; facilitation of the access to finance 95 2
Social Matters Coordination of social security systems; non-discrimination regarding working conditions 91 8
Statistics Harmonisation and/or development of statistical methods; training 98 2
Taxation Assistance in conducting fiscal system reforms 98 2
Terrorism Exchange of information and experience; joint research and studies 100 0
Visa and Asylum Exchange of information; drafting legislation; training 85 14
Source: World Trade Review 2011
WTO-X areas
Description of Provisions
Table IV: PTAs - Depth of Integration
WTO-plus areas
Provision Mentioned and 
 Legally Enforceable
Fraction of PTAsFigure I
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Trade Diverting Tariff Preferences: 
Change in Welfare =  (3-2)
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Figure III: External terms of Trade Effects ­ MERCOSUR 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chang and Winters (2002) 